Showing posts sorted by relevance for query NOFN. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query NOFN. Sort by date Show all posts

Monday 30 June 2014

The Long and Winding Road to Universal Broadband-USOF India

I have expressed reservations about the choice of methodology for OFC connectivity to rural India adopted by USOF India in earlier posts.

A network that was to cover 250000 village panchayats (local self government offices) by 2014 has not been able to cover even 50000 as of now. The new timeline is 2017. Can India afford this time overrun, let alone the inevitable cost overrun this would most likely entail?

The reasons for delay are the inability of  the public sector incumbents BSNL, Railtel and PGCIL (that constitute the implementing agency BBNL) to conclude contracts for purchase and laying of OFC. This is a commonly known problem that anyone familiar with these public sector units would have pointed out in 2012 itself. Interestingly, at that time, avoiding delay in roll out was the reason that the work was given on nomination basis to PSUs rather than bidding it out as per USOF Rules. It was said that benchmarking and tendering would lead to delay! This is in spite of USOF already having initiated two regional OFC projects through the bidding route earlier, implying availability of previous experience in benchmarking and scheme design.

Please see my earlier posts under National Broadband Plans,  Competition and Broadband Networks.


State-run Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd, RailTel and PowerGrid Corp, which are executing the NOFN project, told the review meeting that they were facing challenges in concluding cable laying, trenching and ducting work in their respective zones, said the USOF official who was present at the NOFN review meeting. USOF now expects the three-phase broadband coverage to be concluded earliest in March 2017, which would translate in a five-year delay since the project has already suffered a two-year time ov ..


State-run Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd, RailTel and PowerGrid Corp, which are executing the NOFN project, told the review meeting that they were facing challenges in concluding cable laying, trenching and ducting work in their respective zones, said the USOF official who was present at the NOFN review meeting. USOF now expects the three-phase broadband coverage to be concluded earliest in March 2017, which would translate in a five-year delay since the project has already suffered a two-year time ov ..

State-run Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd, RailTel and PowerGrid Corp, which are executing the NOFN project, told the review meeting that they were facing challenges in concluding cable laying, trenching and ducting work in their respective zones, said the USOF official who was present at the NOFN review meeting. USOF now expects the three-phase broadband coverage to be concluded earliest in March 2017, which would translate in a five-year delay since the project has already suffered a two-year time ov ..

State-run Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd, RailTel and PowerGrid Corp, which are executing the NOFN project, told the review meeting that they were facing challenges in concluding cable laying, trenching and ducting work in their respective zones, said the USOF official who was present at the NOFN review meeting. USOF now expects the three-phase broadband coverage to be concluded earliest in March 2017, which would translate in a five-year delay since the project has already suffered a two-year time ov ..

Sunday 14 February 2016

NOFN-Do we need PPP or plain USOF subsidy?


I reproduce below a news item regarding TRAI recommendations on NOFN 

I have previously pointed out that the simplest and fastest route to funding optic fibre roll out in rural areas would have been to faithfully follow the USOF model of bidding out service areas based on reveres auctions with open access conditions. This was done by USOF for the North Eastern states. That would have been akin to PPP based on BOO model rather than BOOT.

There is absolutely no reason for the ownership of the network to be with/transfer back to the government unless it is to justify the huge paraphernalia that has been created by way of BBNL.  The whole  idea of Universal Service Funds is to provide a minimal smart subsidy and let markets take over. 

Issues such as fair open access and Right of Way cannot necessarily be solved only by public equity participation. NOFN/BBNL  at present under public ownership has failed to deliver for past 4 years (including solving the RoW problem) and its cost has trebled. 

I have examined this debate earlier in my post "Broadband Networks through Infrastructure Sharing Route"  (also placed under the label NOFN). 

Its time we dusted the departmental files containing the original idea of universal service funding based on international best practices and allowed the Indian USOF to deliver as per its own original rules of competitive neutrality. 

The news article:

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) has recommended a public-private partnership (PPP) model for BharatNet, an ambitious project involving setting up a broadband network in rural India.
A model with private incentives and long-term service delivery similar to the build-own-operate transfer or build-operate-transfer models of implementation would be the preferred means of implementation, Trai said in its recommendations announced on Monday.
“PPPs seek to combine the private sector’s capacity for delivery with the Government’s role as an enabler and regulator to overcome market failures. PPPs must be viewed as not just an instrument for easing finance and capacity constraints, but as an effective tool towards ensuring competition in service delivery and improvement in quality of service,” Trai said.
A special purpose vehicle, the Bharat Broadband Network Limited (BBNL), under the telecom ministry is now handling rolling out the optical fibre network being executed by BSNL, Railtel and Power Grid.
The previous government had approved a project cost of Rs 20,000 crore for laying optical fibre network in 2011 but progress has been poor. It is expected that BharatNet will be completed by 2017-18, after missing many deadlines. Even the project cost has increased to about Rs 70,000 crore over the years. The project was earlier named the national optical fibre network but later renamed BharatNet by the current government.
Trai said the concessionaires should be given the job of deploying the optical fibre cable and other network infrastructure as well as operating the network during the period of contract. The contract period should be of 25 years which can be further extended in block of 10, 20 or 30 years.
The national optical fibre network (NOFN) project had failed in achieving its original objective of increasing broadband subscription in the country. The task of rolling out a broadband network should be given to a concessionaire selected through reverse bidding. Funding should be done to bridge the loss incurred due to higher operational expenses and lower commercial accruals, Trai said.
It can be safely concluded that the NOFN has failed in achieving its original objectives, the regulator said. Focusing on the design of the finance and investment model for future roll-out of broadband is critical.
The National Telecom Policy of 2012 (NTP 2012) envisaged broadband on demand by 2015, and 175 million broadband subscribers by 2017 with a minimum speed of 2 Mbps and up to 100 Mbps on demand. As of September 2015, the total number of broadband (defined as download speeds >=512 Kbps) subscribers stood at 120.88 million (largely concentrated in Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu), with only 27.20 million rural subscribers. This “internet divide” between rural and urban India has become more relevant as the scope of activities carried out on the Internet has expanded beyond what was previously imagined, Trai said.
Moreover, rural broadband access will help address multiple service deficits that arise due to other infrastructure related constraints widespread among the rural population. The potential gains from increasing such access are tremendous — the Report of the Committee on NOFN in its projections of the economic benefit from BharatNet estimated that an additional 25 million Internet users by 2018-19 would result in economic benefits of Rs 66,465 crore due to the direct, indirect and spillover benefits of Internet access.
It also recommended that the central and state governments become anchor clients of this project and purchase a bandwidth of 100 megabytes per second at market rate.
To ensure that the concessionaire does not discriminate between service providers in granting access of optical fibres, Trai has recommended arm's length relationship between concessionaire and service providers, adding that 50 per cent of the optical fibre should be reserved for telecom and cable service providers.
Besides, the government should become a minority partner of the concessionaire with 26 per cent stake as this would lower financing cost and risk. "In addition, this can help the government check monopolistic behaviour on the part of the concessionaire," Trai added.

Tuesday 21 January 2014

Delay in NOFN Roll Out-As Expected

The Economic Times today reports yet another delay in roll out of NOFN by BBNL as the PSUs are unable to award contracts worth Rs 6 billion for cable laying and trenching. 

I would invite readers to review my post titled, "National Broadband Plans-The Largely Unexamined Competition Debate" under the label NOFN. I have already covered in previous posts, my reasoning as to why  India should have hesitated before venturing to roll out a country wide network using the nomination route involving Public Sector Incumbents. When various option were being examined as to which methodology to choose for NOFN, there was an explicit impatience with the usual USOF method of first arriving at subsidy benchmarks and then bidding out a scheme on a regional/sub-regional basis to all eligible operators. This was frowned upon as too tedious and a source of delay. 

It was decided that creating an SPV of PSUs would be the better way forward especially as BSNL already owns the chunk of rural OFC networks.

I have examined this debate in my post "Broadband Networks through Infrastructure Sharing Route"  (also placed under the label NOFN). An alternative model has been presented to readers. One that is based on bidding.

 The right way in  my view would have been to encourage/mandate  BSNL to share its OFC capacity with the region wise winning bidder and to include the leasing plus incentive cost in the subsidy benchmarks. With this arrangement the network could have been rolled out by multiple USPs thereby creating the required  non-discriminatory open access  OFC backbone in rural blocks  with no adverse impact on competition. The facilitation extended by USOF (Central Government) by way of coordination with state governments for right of way clearances could have been done in this model too. This would probably have gone faster and ensured that at least  a good proportion  if not all villages would be reaping the benefits of high capacity OFC backbones connectivity by now.


Thursday 19 December 2013

Is this what NOFN was Meant to Do?

Another article appeared today in the Economic Times about NOFN/BBNL  plans to acquire an ISP license to provide e-services based on Wi-Fi in rural areas.

I had written earlier about the proposal to provide Wi-Fi for India's rural local Government offices and my worries on this count. 

Firstly focusing energies on the Village Panchayat Telephone or Government sponsored Common Service Centres(for internet) has not met with notable success in the past. What has succeeded  is the creation of a conducive environment for services and applications to flourish on a commercial basis.
 Thus, in the pre-mobile revolution era, India's subsidised Village Public Telephones which were supposed to be the village life line were often found to be lying in disrepair or being used as private phones of rural elite but once wireless appeared on the scene, commercially run public phones did roaring business.

Secondly, I fail to understand why the Government must select the technology and service provider to deliver e-Government services to citizens. If this was bid out with desired specifications, the lease cost solution could be selected. This would be conistent with the regulations laid down for Universal Service Funding in India

Thirdly, public money (USOF) is being used to fund NOFN/BBNL's OFC roll out which was meant for areas that markets would not serve. Thus, the network was to provide high capacity backhaul from villages to blocks on a non discriminatory basis. NOFN was never meant to be a service provider. If the argument is that its viability is uncertain, well, that is exactly why it is being fully subsidised. If  USOF was to float another tender for broadband access in non viable areas, then the selected access providers would need  back haul and BBNL would get its business and revenues. Ignoring competitive neutrality today means a heavy cost in terms of poor telecommunications in the future. We have already seen this pan out in the case of fixed lines and rural broadband in India.Should we be repeating the same mistakes?

Please also see my posts on NBN and lessons for NOFN.



Monday 25 August 2014

If wishes were horses...

It is reported that,

" [t]he cabinet on Wednesday approved the ambitious Digital India programme that aims to connect all gram panchayats by broadband internet, promote e-governance and transform India into a connected knowledge economy......The vision of the programme is centred on three key areas: digital infrastructure as a utility to every citizen - digital identity, mobile phone and bank account, safe & secure cyber space; governance & services on demand - services available in real time on online and mobile platform, making financial transactions electronic and cashless, & digital empowerment of citizens - all documents, certificates available on cloud.Digital India envisages connecting 2.5 lakh villages by broadband and phones, reduce import of telecom imports to zero, wi-fi in 2.5 lakh schools, all universities, public wi-fi hotspots for citizens and creating 1.7 crore direct and 8.5 crore indirect jobs. Other impact points include training 1.7 crore citizens for IT, telecom and electronics jobs, and delivering e-governance and e-services."

As usual the programme that comes at a hefty cost of more than Rs one billion hinges on the success of USOF India's National Optic Fibre roll-out for broadband delivery.

All one can say is good luck with that! The same news item explains why I hold this view:

"Soon after assuming office, IT and telecom minister Ravi Shankar Prasad had said that the new BJP-led government will on priority take up the plan to connect 2,50,000 gram panchayats through the optic fibre network. The government plans to connect 50,000 gram panchayats this fiscal year itself ending March 31, 2014, one lakh in the next fiscal year and a similar number the year after.      The Rs 21,000-crore NOFN project - fully funded by the USOF - was unveiled by the UPA to digitally connect 2,50,000 gram panchayats. However, the project has not progressed much so far - delayed by over three years - due mainly as the cable laying and ducting process is yet to be finished. Among the pillars is mobile connectivity for all, which includes covering all the about 42,300 unpenetrated villages at a cost of Rs 16,000 crore to be completed by 2017-2018."

Views on the manner of planning and execution of NOFN / BBNL and alternative means of achieving broadband  roll outs through USOF are documented in previous posts. 

Interestingly, years after the project was initiated by way of an SPV of three public sector companies, the telecom regulator while commenting on the Digital India Plan has reportedly stated that the NOFN project is running over three years behind target and only 8% of the 0.18 million  kms of optic fibre has been rolled out. He says that private sector should be involved in NOFN roll out and that,
"Investment of private players could significantly reduce the cost of the entire   the project and therefore final tariffs"

The regulator also rightly points out the need for detailed planing of the actual content for the envisaged e-government services rather than limiting the plan to vague terminology such as e-health,e-education and the need to involve private sector in content development (rather than just depending on strengthening/ revamping the state agencies  as a means to achieve the plan.)


Sunday 30 June 2013

Well Organised Emergency Communications Capabilities

The recent events in Uttarakhand, India where floods have wreaked havoc destroying thousands of  lives and livelihoods, sweeping away whole villages, roads and mobile towers leaving thousands people stranded and in need of rescue, highlights the importance of preparedness, mitigation and meticulous planning for disaster management (DM). One aspect of this planning is emergency communications.

India is now beginning to take cognizance of  areas like single emergency number and priority call routing. However,  instead of a piecemeal approach, a more holistic approach would be far more effective.

Lets examine the issue of Priority Call Routing first. Please also see my previous blog at http://ictsforall.blogspot.in/2013/06/universal-access-to-emergency-services.html

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India's (TRAI) analysis as seen from its consultation paper  was as follows;

 TRAI’s reasons for the need for priority call routing during disasters include inter alia: 

  • The wide variety of radio equipment used by various public safety organisations is frequently incompatible, preventing communication between responders.
  • In extreme circumstances, official public safety systems may fail.
  • Civil networks often provide greater capability for data communications than their public safety counterparts. The latter are often provided with very limited transmission capacity which is not upgraded as quickly as civil networks.
  • NGOs and private sector responders play a critical role in response but may not have access to public safety networks. Often during disasters the civilian telephone networks are not so much destroyed as congested into uselessness. This can paralyze official response during disasters.

Based upon on the above premises, the consultation paper focuses primarily on network congestion issue and attempts to find ways and means to ensure that network congestion bottlenecks are eased for official and unofficial agencies involved in response and recovery.

Solutions suggested by TRAI: TRAI has suggested that one possible solution is network dimensioning (core network, POI circuits) in a manner that facilitates handling of increased volume of traffic during disasters. Needless to say, while telecommunication networks are dimensioned to meet mandated quality of service (QoS) standards keeping in view normal estimates of peak traffic, dimensioning to handle disasters would involve extra costs which telecom service providers may be reluctant to bear. The second option the TRAI has suggested is priority call routing for personnel involved in response and recovery. 

TRAI's analysis accepts that a  resilient telecommunication networks  (so as to cater to communications during disasters/ emergencies), would include (a) proper network  dimensioning, (b) emergency communication alternatives like satellite radio, ham radios and (c) a comprehensive strategy to rebuild or repair lost infrastructure. This is however considered to be a time consuming and costly exercise and hence priority call routing is suggested as an immediately implementable and less costly solution. 

TRAI goes on to describe:

a) The United States Government’s emergency phone service for the National Security for emergency preparedness community to communicate over the existing public switched telephone network (PSTN) with a high likelihood of call completion even during network congestion or disruption with the help of enhancements based upon existing commercial technology. This is called   Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS) in case of landline systems. A similar system for wireless networks is the Wireless Priority Service (WPS). GETS and WPS are authentication based priority call routing systems but do not pre-empt on-going calls or preclude public use of the civilian network. 

b) Canada too has a WPS system similar to that of USA.

c) U.K’s Mobile Telecommunication Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS). This system restricts civilian access to cellular phone networks during emergencies. It actively prevents civilian use from congesting the cellular networks, thus allowing emergency services personnel priority for communications. Entitled users are provided with special SIMs to enable communications, while normal users will receive a beep indicating that the network has been reserved for MPTAS –aware phones.

d) Certain other models of priority calling such as that based upon a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) concept or enhanced multilevel precedence and pre-emption (eMLPP) have also been discussed. While the former would entail dedication of part network resources to the virtual emergency operator during crisis, the latter pre-empts radio resources based on assigned priority. 

My Comments are as follows:

Regarding TRAI’s assumptions about present shortcoming of DM communications systems and remedies thereof

(i) Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) are already making efforts to expeditiously establish and enhance disaster communications networks by way of National Disaster Communications Network , National Emergency Communications Plan Phase I and II schemes. This is to be  backed by Disaster Management (DM) information systems such as National Database for Emergency Management (NDEM)and National Disaster Management Informatics System (NDMIS) (with inbuilt Vulnerability Analysis & Risk Assessment and Decision Support  tools). 
(ii) Given the existence of the above mentioned  schemes, the establishment of a high capacity, resilient, comprehensive and inter-operable (compatible) DM communications network cannot be assumed to be time consuming and beyond immediate financial capability of the Government. However, due care must be taken to ensure inter-operability of networks and devices.
(iii) It may be noted that these schemes provide for communications facilities for District authorities National Disaster Response Force personnel and other field level functionaries who are the first responders. It is felt that all government agencies expected to be involved in emergency/disaster relief must mandatorily use/have access to inter-operable NDCN elements and post disaster, they must switch over to this system to free up the public telecommunications network to others. Further, reliance should be placed on pre-planned network augmentation and ad hoc networks as already provided in NDCN, rather than planning for preemption of the PSTN.(I discuss this further below)
(iv) In the light of the above, it would be appropriate for NDMA, MHA and TRAI etc.to align their respective approaches to Disaster related communications. It would be advisable to prioritize the expeditious roll out of these schemes ensuring adequate capacity and inter-operability, rather than to plan for procedures to take over public communications which are critical means of alerting normal citizens/potential victims of disaster and can greatly aid in rescue and relief operations.

Regarding the importance of public networks for victims of disasters and hence need for a holistic approach

(i) The overall teledensity in India is 79.58% (July 2012). Urban teledensity is 169% and rural teledensity is 40%. Internet/broadband penetration though not high (23 million internet and 14.57 million broadband subscribers), is increasing rapidly (18% growth of broadband subscribers over previous year). Along with availability and affordability of telecommunications services, basic mobile usage literacy and e-literacy is on the rise among Indians no matter which economic strata they belong to. Ordinary citizens either as victims or others are the first to be present on the scene of the disaster. Needless to say, communications are critical to their survival as it becomes a lifeline to obtain help. Modern technology also enables caller location facilities which are invaluable for rescue and relief workers to locate injured/trapped individuals.
(ii) Rather than restricting public access to critical communications facilities, congestion on networks can be avoided by having efficient and reliable disaster warning and information systems including internet based message boards which the public would rely on rather than relying on interpersonal communications to make (anxiety) calls.  We should also be considering early warning systems like IPAWS as an integral part of emergency communications .
(Please also see my previous post on this issue at http://ictsforall.blogspot.in/2013/06/communications-imperatives-in-disaster.html)
(iii) Government should plan to make effective use of TV and radio and internet enabled social media forums and message boards to this end. service providerss can play a critical role through message boards and SMS broadcasts. Community education is also an important facet. 
(iv) TRAI can play a critical role in recommending/mandating the specific duties and overall cooperation of service providers in this regard. TRAI has not analysed the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP)  programme under USA's Office of Emergency Communication's for emergency communications. This needs to be put in place as a part of licensing conditions of service providers. 
(iv) Relief and rescue agencies should be able to receive emergency calls from public on the public network but should use dedicated communications resources to interface with each other.

Thus some concrete measures for the present would be:

(i) While most telecommunications infrastructure is necessarily designed to withstand normal climatic conditions of an area, TRAI could carry out an analysis of specific area-wise vulnerabilities in conjunction with NDMA and DoT, and accordingly mandate special technical standards for network resilience and dimensioning of telecommunication networks in highly vulnerable areas. DoT’s Telecom Engineering Centre has already prepared draft guidelines in this regard which could be used/refined. The additional cost borne for retrofitting or supplementing existing network elements could be borne by the Government. All future infrastructure, networks and services after a specified cut off date would however mandatorily comply with revised technical specifications.
ii. The Universal Service Obligation Fund of India is administered by an USOF Administrator and functions as an attached office of Department of Telecommunications.  As USOF is mandated to provide telecommunications services to the people in rural and remote areas at reasonable and affordable prices, it follows that the existence of robust and disaster resilient networks falls within USOF’s mandate. Thus a USOF scheme could be designed for one time upgrading of existing networks in such vulnerable rural areas. 
iii. TRAI should take into cognizance the fact that world over, increasing importance is being give to universal access to emergency services (across platforms, including IP networks) and caller location services are being mandated. 
iv. The availability and accessibility of emergency communications to the aged and disabled is also something that even developing countries are according increasing priority to. These fall in the purview of Universal Service in most countries and TRAI may recommend necessary action to DoT. 
v. It may be noted that the USOF Administration is funding a nationwide rural optic fibre network (NOFN) (through an SPV namely, Bharat Broadband Network Ltd) to connect 2.5 lakh village panchyats (local self government offices). NOFN can serve as a valuable backbone in times of disasters/emergencies. With a view to provide high capacity DM related connectivity, NOFN can provide fibre in the last mile to critical rural structures such as schools, hospitals apart from local administration. While redundancy is most likely an inbuilt design feature for NOFN, it should be specially ensured that NOFN has the necessary disaster resilience to extent possible. 
vi. TRAI may consider making recommendations to DoT on a national Disaster Management Plan for Telecommunications Infrastructure and Services. This is mandated under Section 37 of the Disaster Management Act 2005. This would cover every stage of the Disaster Management cycle from mitigation to relief and early recovery. Business Continuity Planning for service providers should be a part of the same.
vii. Finally a holistic approach may be adopted rather than picking up only one segement of international best practices for emergency communications

Friday 29 November 2013

Wi Fi Internet for Indian Village Local Government Offices-Going Around in Circles?

A news item in the Times of India (November 30, 2013)  titled "Govt clears internet wi-fi plan for rural India" states that a proposal to provde wi-fi hotspots and internet connections to India's Gram Panchayats has recently been approved. Slated to cost Rs 37.5 billion and targeted to be completed by 2016, the project will be funded by Indian USOF and will ride on NOFN infrastructure, 

This may be an excellent idea with two caveats. 

One is that past experience has shown that telecom services in Panchayats tend to be used only by the rural elite and are unavailable to the common people. During USOF inspections I have seen private public calling offices doing roaring business whereas the USO funded village public telephone located in the village panchayat (local self government office) bang opposite, on the other side of the village mud track was being exclusively used by the local elite. Villagers were in fact unaware of this state funded facility. Thus, given the social and economic set up of Indian villages such facilities could encourage better data keeping and connectivity within the government set up but are likely to percolate to rural society at large. The village school may have been a better venue for such a facility if empowering the common people is the aim, but then more effort would be involved in managing, maintaining and manning the facility. I have written before about the need to look at various other facets of the demand side eco-system. You need applications and trainers/facilitators in rural India. This requires a multi-stakeholder approach to project design. A good and successful example is USOF's Sanchar Shakti.

My second concern is who is providing the last mile service. I hope it is not NOFN. The entry of NOFN into access segment would in my view negate the very idea of Universal Service as a modern mechanism in a liberalized sector as being different from state owned monopoly service provision. Please see my previous articles in this regard under the same labels.

Tuesday 29 October 2013

BBNL and Competition Neutral Broadband Funding

The Economic Time reports that BBNL(NOFN) which is at present an infrastructure provider may acquire a unified license and become a service provider. This broadband network funded by USOF India was to provide OFC connectivity to 2.5 lakh village panchayats (local self government offices) up to block level as private operators were not likely to cater to this market segment.

It is reported that,

"The government is looking to "revise BBNL's mandate" as it wants it to directly deliver high-speed broadband services down to the district level to maximise utilisation of NOFN infrastructure, which is the communications ministry's biggest telecom venture.

The immediate plan is use the NOFN resources to build a "government-user overlay network" — akin to a virtual private network — for delivering a host of citizen-centric e-services to bridge the digital divide across rural India.

The DoT has proposed joint funding of the "proposed overlay network" by the Universal Services Obligation Fund (USOF) and the ministry of rural development. It wants USOF to handle the entire upfront capex payout — pegged at Rs 3,750 crore — and the rural development ministry to handle opex over a 10-year span - estimated at about .`1,860 crore a year - putting the total cost at Rs crore, excluding taxes."

In my previous posts on National Broadband Plans and incumbent centric, public funded Broadband Networks I have highlighted the importance of competition and avoidance of market distortions or recreation of monopolies. I believe that if BBNL were to complete roll out and the government was to focus on            e-government services (applications), a host of private and public sector telecom service providers would step in to provide last mile connectivity for broadband enabled services on commercial considerations.

In fact it has recently been reported that India has croseed the billion mark as far as e governance transactions go. Also that, "[w]ith more parts of the country getting connected through the National Optic Fibre Network, industry watchers expect more citizens to be accessing government services over the internet. ... The network has been launched in pockets of Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and Tripura, with some 80,500 transactions already recorded."




Wednesday 6 May 2015

NOFN-Getting it wrong yet again

An editorial humorously titled "Optical Illusion" correctly points out that the latest government effort to revive BBNL/NOFN by way of appointing a private sector chairman etc. is not likely to make much of a difference. However  the newspaper gets it wrong in suggesting that the USOF which is funding NOFN/BBNL, should be scrapped.

On the contrary, BBNL should be wound up and the methodology to achieve the laying of a high speed rural OFC network should go back to the traditional USOF method of achieving rural penetration through multiple (regional) reverse bidding based projects open to both public and private sector.

Just scrapping USOF (funded out of license fees paid by service providers) and leaving more money in the hands of service providers will not guarantee provision of broad band services to commercially unviable rural areas.

 I have written extensively on the subject under the same key words/labels. Please see my previous blogs.

Saturday 5 December 2015

NOFN/BBNL-Back to Square One Almost

I have not written for a while. Been busy in another sphere of regulation. However, I was drawn back to my much neglected blog by TRAI's recent Consultation paper on Implementation Model for BharatNet (BBNL has been rechristened BharatNet.)

So, after almost five precious years down the line and with nothing to show except inflated project estimates and an unnecessary bureaucracy created by way of BBNL, India's National Optic Fibre Network (NOFN) plan is being subject to public consultation. Its almost a case of reinventing the wheel which is right there in front of you by way of the existing regulatory structure of India's Universal service Obligation Fund (USOF). USOF Rules require the Government to provide incentive to telecom operators (public/private) to venture into commercially non viable rural telecommunications by way of subsidy to close the viability gap. The projects are to be designed with appropriate bidding units in mind (state/district etc.), subsidy benchmarking is to be carried out and projects are awarded through reverse bidding with the subsidy benchmark acting as the upper limit.

Had this been adhered to 5 years ago, we would have had the village to block level OFC laid out on open access basis by now. Different segments  (say state wise village to block level OFC, if states had been chosen as the bidding unit) would have been owned by different operators but connected at the district level to existing nation wide networks. This would have provided much needed OFC back haul at village level to telecom operators who often had to rely on unreliable microwave back haul, and provided a strong impetus to large/niche/small players in the rural broadband space.

Even now the TRAI paper talks about Build Own Operate and Transfer as the one option that would come closest to the USOF model. Why transfer. Why must the Government own telecoms infrastructure in a liberalised environment and be saddled with this depreciating asset? The whole philosophy of Universal Service has been lost in translation in the Indian scenario.   The creation and compulsion of  continued survival of BBNL is perhaps the reason why the Government cannot discard the concept of ownership. This goes against international best practices that point to smart, targeted use of universal service funds to incentivise operators and then leaving them to manage their business.The idea was never to create Government owned assets or to use the USOF to pay salaries to a bureaucratic organisation like BBNL. Unless our goals are clear , we will never get this right.

Please also see my previous posts on NOFN and BBNL.

Thursday 2 October 2014

Broadband Planning in India-Missing the Wood for the trees

I reproduce below the text of my article with the same title. It was published in the Financial Express today.

In the recent TRAI consultation paper titled Delivering Broadband Quickly: What do we Need to do?, the issues delineated for stakeholder consultation give the impression that the solution lies in controlling or influencing technological choices or costs. In a liberalised sector, healthy competition accompanied by efficient regulation would mean that market dynamics guide appropriate technological and cost choices, without government intervention. When regulatory interventions go beyond what is necessary to correct market failure, they create and exacerbate market distortions, doing more harm than good. India’s abnormally low ratio of wirelines to wireless connections is part of the broadband problem. While the paper has fleetingly mentioned public sector monopoly in this segment, it has not related the same to poor and falling wireline penetration in our country. Nor has it mentioned the abysmal state of rural broadband penetration, which persists in being negligible in spite of billions of rupees of funding to the incumbent in support of its wireline services by way of access deficit charges and universal service funding.

The relationship between competitive service provision and innovation, quality, and long-term growth in telecommunications is too well known to ignore, and unless efforts are made to correct underlying regulatory problems and consequential market distortions, we may not be able to move forward.

Sadly, one of the most market-friendly initiatives of the government which is key to promotion of broadband—the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF)—has also fallen prey to the same lack of understanding. The USOF subsidy is given to willing market players (universal service providers or USPs) to cover the viability gap and hence encourage them to provide services in commercially unviable areas. The USOF subsidised facilities are owned by USPs rather than by the government. Thus, USOF is potentially a valuable tool for minimalistic, targeted interventions to achieve greater penetration of broadband in a competition friendly manner.

A very important aspect of preventing market distortion is ensuring technological neutrality and competitive neutrality. The former would imply defining deliverables to be achieved through the USOF subsidy, while leaving specific technology choices and configurations to USPs’ wisdom. The latter implies that no entity operating in an economic market should be subject to undue competitive advantages or disadvantages.

It is well known that while the government as regulator is supposed to ensure a level-playing field, the government as owner of public enterprises may face difficulties in balancing various conflicting commercial and non-commercial interests.However, regulatory neutrality, which encompasses both technological and competitive neutrality, is a sine qua non for economic efficiency or welfare maximisation.

From data available on the USOF website, it would appear that USOF’s present regulatory framework has been unsuccessful in this regard. USOF had disbursed R17,580 crore of subsidy up to January 31, 2014, of which rural fixed line telephony and broadband based schemes taken together account for about 95%. Yet rural teledensity at 43% is made up almost entirely of private sector wireless connections. Rural wireline teledensity is less than 1% and broadband penetration negligible. BSNL’s monopoly in the rural wireline and optic fibre segment has meant that majority of the USOF support (focused disproportionately on fixed lines) has been given to BSNL on nomination basis. The other technologies mentioned in the Trai paper would perhaps have been deployed by USPs long ago, had USOF’s schemes been technologically neutral.

The USOF website reveals that the roll out of deliverables by BSNL as USP has been delayed consistently. For example, against a target of approximately 8.8 lakh broadband connections and 28,000 broadband kiosks by January 2014 under the Wireline Broadband Scheme, BSNL had provided only about 4.3 lakh broadband connections and less than 11,000 kiosks. Despite its poor track record, BSNL was chosen as one of the three PSUs to partner in the National Optical Fibre Network (NOFN) project through the creation of Bharat Broadband Network Limited (BBNL).

NOFN’s tardy progress has been documented in the consultation paper. While dwelling on which model to adopt for rural OFC backhaul, the USOF model of reverse bidding with the lowest bidder (public or private) setting up open access networks under contract was considered, but rejected as being tedious and long drawn, as it involves subsidy benchmarking. Instead, the BBNL route was chosen. The result of this choice made three years ago is out there for us to see. BBNL has not made even a dent in the targeted roll out (2.5 lakh gram panchayats by 2014) and what’s worse is the reported doubling of estimated costs from Rs 20,000 crore (A crore is 10 million) to more than Rs 40,000 crore. 

Going forward, a focus on regulatory neutrality would be the order of the day and a major part of what needs to be done.

Saturday 22 June 2013

Broadband Networks through the Infrastructure Sharing Route

I had mentioned earlier that we should perhaps be concerned about the current trend of state funding for broadband roll outs. It is often presumed that private sector will not roll out high capacity Optic Fibre Cable (OFC) networks at the speed or with the spread required for desired levels of broadband penetration.

It is true that private sector may need various incentives or even subsidies to venture into less lucrative markets or uneconomical areas. However, in my view, a variety of measures can be taken  that still fall short of state funding or state ownership.

The Universal Service Fund of India (USOF) had initiated two excellent schemes for the remote and relatively backward North Eastern states of Assam,  Meghalaya, Mizoram,  Tripura (N.E I Telecom Circle) and Nagaland, Manipur Arunachal Pradesh (N.E II Telecom Circle) that involve high capacity OFC backbone networks being laid out in rural areas (from district to block level) through Output Based Aid projects. These were bid out (reverse bidding) after a painstaking bench-marking exercise to arrive at the upper limit of subsidy, keeping in view possibility of renting out existing OFC from incumbent operators, apart from laying fresh cable. The resultant network is to be shared by the lowest bidder i.e. designated Universal Service Provider or Host Operator  on non-discriminatory, open access basis with other service providers. The tariff  offered by the USP has to be at a specified rate of discount vis-a-vis the Telecom Regulatory Authority's  (TRAI's) ceiling rates for leasing OFC. Discounts were worked out keeping in view capital cost subsidies, revenue projections and operating cost requirements. The bid for the states of Assam was won by the incumbent fixed line operator BSNL. However interestingly for the N.E states Railtel won the bid even without BSNL's  advantage of ownership of majority of OFC networks. There is a strong possibility that it has relied on back-end agreements for renting OFC from private operators rather than laying fresh cable to achieve its obligations in a cost effective manner. This is permitted by the USOF tender. 

The above Private Public Partnership model could have been successfully replicated for block to village level roll outs too. Given that OFC as a technology/broadband platform is here to stay, adeqaute subsidies on reverse bidding basis could have attracted private capital in many (if not all) bidding units (states/telecom circles). This model was rejected during decision making on the National Optic Fibre Network (NOFN) on the debatable grounds that bench-marking takes too long. Personal experience with the above mentioned schemes tells me that this is not correct and that the benefits of involving a large number of market players in laying of the nation's OFC backhaul far outweigh the effort involved in tendering individual bidding units.  I have mentioned earlier relying on public ownership or funding the incumbent is perhaps more attractive in the short run in terms of  relatively less time and effort required to commence roll outs. However the long term impact of monopoly ownership of even open access networks (on competition and accompanying aspects such as innovation/customer service/technological neutrality) and regulatory burden involved in ensuring open access on continuing basis, merit consideration.

It is interesting to note that Indian telecommunications players are looking at voluntary sharing of OFC networks and setting up joint ventures to invest and manage shared networks as the way forward. This may be happening only in cities and towns at present, but it is a moot point whether this trend would not have been replicated eventually in rural areas if the PPP approach to network roll out had been followed.

As of now 2.5 lakh village panchayats (local government centres) are to be connected through NOFN or the public sector SPV called Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. This roll out would take high speed broadband  to rural India and hopefully revolutionize rural telecommunications. It is hoped that the roll out is achieved on time and  that the resultant network is effectively regulated to ensure open access and a level playing field between participating Public Sector Units (PSUs) and various private entities involved in the broadband eco system. needless to say these supply side initiatives must be accompanied by measures to address other aspects of the rural broadband value chain.   

Another important, not entirely unrelated development is the forthcoming creation of a Telecom Finance Corporation to provide capital to telecom operators in India at internationally competitive rates. This should give a fillip to network and service expansion and will hopefully be used to fund not only infrastructure but also content and capacity building  related projects.

Tuesday 4 November 2014

An update on NOFN

My last post "Broadband Planning in India-Missing the Wood for the Trees" had highlighted the tardy progress of the all important NOFN project. I had mentioned  the rejection of the USOF bidding model which would have enabled private sector participation.Now it is  reported the government is contemplating a larger role for the private sector. 

Friday 11 October 2013

National Broadband Plans-The Largely Un-examined Competition Debate

I recently came across a very interesting post on the subject of competition in OFC roll outs. This well written post by Paul Budde argues that (in the Australian context but extrapolating through examples to the international context) either we do not really need infrastructure competition in OFC infrastructure or at least it is not a very practical possibility. He cites USA and Europe as examples of lack of nation-wide fixed line competition.

It would take much more than a blog post to analyse his arguments but I would like to make one simple counter argument. Why must we have a nation wide network? In vast countries like India, USA and Australia even regional or sub regional fixed networks would be a feasible option. In non viable areas, competitive service provision may be seeded by Universal service funding. Please see my post on the Indian USOF model at Broadband Networks through the Infrastructure Sharing Route. This model did succeed in creating potential competition to the incumbent with USOF subsidy even in a remote region of the country. Other posts on infrastructure sharing could also be viewed. 

Perhaps the inability to fathom such a model comes from historical reasons wherein in almost every country the incumbent managed to protect its monopoly by harping on the economies of scale issue and the best option with the state was to regulate prices etc. Regulating monopolies cannot solve inefficiency and lack of drive to innovate that plagues all monopoly service provision. Readers are invited to read my previous posts on NBN and NOFN. Today both networks are delayed and mired in roll out problems. There is a news item about NOFN planning to impose heavy penalties on its vendors who are delaying roll out. Need I say more. I have written earlier cautioning against the faddish nature of national broadband plans and the fact that they are likely to recreate monopolies with the usual set of associated problems.

Also, unlike Mr Budde, I am not so sure that mobile networks can ever be considered perfect substitutes for fixed lines. European regulators seem to agree with me.  

I do agree that service level competition is very critical, but as far as competition in broadband goes, if it is there at every level-all the better. 

Tuesday 16 February 2016

Hitting the Nail on the Head

It was a delight to read an article titled, "Net neutral, shift gears" It reiterates strongly the reasons why hard won net neutrality must be preserved and safeguarded from anti-competitive attempts to introduce divisions within the internet. Yet, it urges India to bridge the digital divide and connect every Indian immediately.

The only point where I disagree is the present idea/version of NOFN. I believe that universal broadband coverage can be achieved much faster and in a much more cost efficient manner by sticking to the original USOF concept of bidding out districts/states/regions in a technology neutral , competitive process that enables interested telecom operators to provide connectivity as defined by the Fund, with a limited smart subsidy.

The creation of a huge administrative set up by way of a megalithic government organisation and funding it from USOF ; expecting it to deliver any better than a monopolistic government department  in pre-liberalisation India, is in my view a wasteful, pipe dream. Please see my previous blogs on NOFN/BBNL.

Friday 26 December 2014

NOFN-Better Late than Never?

My last post was about NOFN and the government considering private sector involvement. Not much has been reported about that realization being actually put into practice. Today's Financial Express does report however that,

 Industry analysts have all along being critical of the project from the point of view that its implementation is being done by PSUs rather than awarding work to private sector agencies on a turnkey basis.

In fact, with the delays and a realisation in the top echelons that the deadline would be missed, DoT is also considering roping in private agencies. Under it, the plan is to divide the the entire country into zones and allocate private players to lay the network. In this outsourcing model, [USOF model] the role of the government would be only supervisory, setting benchmarks, providing incentives for completion of work on time and levying penalties in case of delays.

Well what can one say, I have blogged about this a lot. In my view such expensive mistakes are a problem of the (lack of) regularity neutrality problem we face.  Please see my recent paper titled,  "The State of Broadband in India: A Call for Regulatory Neutrality" at
http://circ.in/pdf/Regulatory-Neutrality-in-Broadband-India.pdf

Thursday 12 December 2013

The NBN Debate Continues-Lessons for India's NOFN?

It is reported that an independent review of NBN ordered by the new Coalition Government of Australia has found that NBN costs and time lines have been understated and revenues overstated.

The news report states that,

"'The  full cost of Labor's original National Broadband Network plans would blow out by $29 billion and be completed three years late, the strategic review has found.
Communications Minister Malcolm Turnbull released details of the review he started 60 days ago on Thursday.The review found the fibre-to-the-premises NBN under Labor would have cost $73 billion, $29 billion more than forecast, and not be completed until 2024.It also found the current NBN Co corporate plan had overestimated revenues from the network by $13 billion.While the review found the cost and timing of the original plans would blow out, Opposition communications spokesman Jason Clare challenged the review's findings.He released an internal government analysis of the Coalition's plans, which he said revealed the new government's plans were "the wrong approach", and would not achieve the promised speeds.

Mr Turnbull has pledged download speeds of 50mbps by 2019 under the Coalition's plan, which will rely on copper connecting to fibre nodes, rather than brining the higher-speed fibre direct to all homes.

But Mr Clare said the analysis should the two stage approach - with 25mbps promised by 2016, expanding to 50mbps by 2019 - was unworkable.

He said the government's fibre-to-the-node plan would lower revenues from the network by 30% and the actual cost of fixing the existing Telstra-owned copper network, and was "unknown".

But Mr Turnbull said the review found the Labor network was "never achievable", and the results of the review would be "a crucial input into government policy".

Clearly the debate can go on forever. Nevertheless a mid term policy/projectreview and corrective steps are a good idea for any ambitious national broadband network roll out. India's NOFN/BBNL is already in difficulties. Ironically though it is being heavily subsidized because it is supposed to be financially nonviable and the PSU SPV route was chosen to cut red tape in Right of Way and other such causes of delay; the three PSU implementation partners in charge of this project are now citing the very same reasons for their difficulties and delays. Time for a review of costs and revenue projections and last but not lease scheme design? 

Wednesday 6 November 2013

NOFN Veering Away from its Core Objective?

In a post titled BBNL and Competition Neutral Broadband Funding I had mentioned the proposal to make India's USF funded rural broadband back haul provider into a service provider.

In an article from the Economic Times it is now learned that BBNL is likely to acquire only an Internet Service Provider license. While this is better than it trying to become a unified service provider it is not what a state funded broadband back haul network is supposed to do. It would become difficult to regulate BBNL's wholesale bandwidth and ensure a level playing field vis-a-vis its own service provider arm. 

As regards the lack of interest among ISPs to venture into rural areas to provide internet, I would not agree with the justification provided in the article. The whole idea of NOFN/BBNL was to eliminate the high speed and bandwidth back haul issue and to allow private and public players to provide last mile access (with this problem taken care off). If the Government was to provide the latter too, the funding may as well have gone to the incumbent BSNL by way of budgetary support instead of creating another PSU monopoly.

A proper study and public consultation process would be in order before assuming a lack of interest  in tapping the rural market among India's multiple  ISP's. (392 as per Department of Telecom's website). There are competition issues here which invariably mean issues realting to long term health of the sector.

Saturday 27 December 2014

Competitive Neutrality in Liberalized Sectors of the Economy

I have been blogging about the need for competitive neutrality mostly in the context of  broadband networks. However, the importance of regulatory neutrality would apply equally to any other liberalized sector be it say, power or airlines. I have written about this in a paper titled,

Interestingly, though seldom do papers in India comment on this problem in the context of telecommunications, I find mention of the issue in the context of power transmission. Thus the Financial Express has reported that,

The central power regulator’s bid to end public sector dominance in the transmission sector by putting in place a system to award new projects based on tariff-based competitive bidding (TBCB) is threatening to unravel with the power ministry deciding to virtually persist with the previous regime where the projects are given on a platter to the state-run Power Grid Corporation (PGCIL).
According to sources, the ministry has invoked a provision in the relevant Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) rules to give eight new transmission projects with an estimated cost of Rs 36,000 crore to PGCIL....The provision of “compressed time schedule” vests discretion with the ministry to nominate PGCIL for executing projects if it is convinced that the bidding route could delay projects that are of critical nature, requiring time-bound execution.

An industry official said: “Any incumbent that continues to have 70-80% market share will have a natural advantage over new entrants in terms of winning even future projects being bid out. Moreover, if that incumbent is a PSU, then it will have clear financing advantages which private players cannot match under current circumstances.”...

Criticising the government’s decision, an executive of a private firm involved in the transmission sector told FE on condition of anonymity that it was the need of the hour to encourage private participation in transmission so that it can bring global technologies to complete projects in compressed time schedules. 

This echoes what I have written about NOFN/BBNL. I particular in my paper titled,  "The State of Broadband in India: A Call for Regulatory Neutrality" wherein I have specifically mentioned that,

"Public funding in a developing nation has to  be undertaken with particular care on account of the opportunity cost of allocating scarce resources. Subsidy schemes are designed to minimise costs and avoid duplicating expensive infrastructure. This could explain BSNL’s nomination in the Wireline Broadband scheme, its winning the bid in the Assam OFC scheme and its role in the forthcoming NOFN.  While this approach makes apparent sense in terms of short term financial prudence, its impact on the long term growth of the sector is unlikely to be positive given that it stifles competition and all its concomitant benefits. From a bureaucratic perspective, relying on public ownership or funding the incumbent is also perhaps more attractive in the short run in terms of relatively less time and effort estimated to commence roll outs (as against tendering/auction), even if we were to assume that public sector could and would deliver. However, the long term impact of monopoly ownership of even open access networks (on competition and accompanying aspects such as innovation/customer service/technological neutrality) merit consideration. If nothing else, our experience with monopoly in wire lines should have cautioned us. USOF had almost got it right with its regional OFC schemes, but it needs to be rescued from over specification of technology and incumbent -centric scheme design through regulation which insists inter alia on competitive neutrality. Thus, rather than doing away with USOF as is the demand of the aggrieved private sector, a relook at its regulatory structure and a focus on competitive neutrality would be the order of the day..." 

Sunday 23 June 2013

National Broadband Networks: Regulation, Universal Service, Competition and Monopolies

One of the fundamental principles of Universal Service (US) is that it should complement and supplement effective regulation, liberalization and competition rather than replace these measures as a means of achieving greater telecommunications penetration. In fact, Universal Access (UA)/ US as obligations or policy instruments should ideally come into play when these measures have failed to address what is known as the actual access gap. This gap may arise on account of geographical or socio-economic reasons etc.

Source: WDRP 432(2002) as modified by Archana.G.Gulati 

With this in view, legal   definitions of Universal Service (as in the EU and USA ) often have an explicit references to competitive neutrality. However, while The European Union’s Universal Service Directive adopts a meticulous approach whereby market distortions are consciously  avoided at every step be it the  scope of US,  choice of technology, choice of Universal Service Providers(USPs), source of funding US etc. USA’s approach is not so rigorous. Similarly the Indian USOF legal framework lacks any such explicit reference or obligation to carry out an ex ante analysis to establish market failure or ensure competitive neutrality of US interventions.

Over the past two decades dramatic progress has been made in telecommunications penetration, particularly in mobile voice segment. This has been possible on account of technological innovations and competition which drives service providers to innovate, improve quality and meet customers’ demand at affordable prices. In a monopoly environment as persisted before the onset of mobile services, the regulatory burden of ensuring affordable services was much higher as the incumbent operator/operators were subject to various tariff restrictions and interconnection regulations to prevent misuse of monopoly /oligopoly situation. Non discrimination and transparency of information as well as consumer protection, while they are regulatory concerns even in competitive markets become far more acute in case of monopolies.

Given the importance of high speed broadband and the fact that roll out in certain markets would not be economical, governments across the world are funding OFC based broadband networks.The rationale for/criticism for focusing on OFC in backahul  or access services would merit a separate discussion, but is definitely a key issue as it impinges on technological neutrality which is a subset of competitive neutrality.

While most of these these public/US funded OFC networks are slated to be open access networks, care should be taken to avoid displacing private investment and initiative which may have been forthcoming with the right regulatory environment or incentives. Use of public funds/universal service funds should ideally be restricted to areas where markets have failed and logically the best course is to bid out such network provision to allow a level playing field between private and public operators. This may lead to a more fragmented approach than one integrated network but contractual obligations can ensure seamless connectivity between and non-discriminatory open access to backbone networks owned by various entities.  (see previous blog post) Such a PPP approach rather than publicly/incumbent owned networks may prove to be more competition and growth friendly in the long run even if it entails more effort in the short term. The use of public funding in pockets where no operator will venture or where effective competition is unlikely in spite of effective regulation (akin to European Commissions white or grey areas) is however justifiable. 

ITU's Trends in Telecommunications Reform 2013, has made a pertinent observation:

   'Developing countries in particular face challenges in promoting growth of Internet assets that will   support the widespread availability and adoption of broadband. These differences are based in part on geography, distance, and scale, but are also highly sensitive to competitive conditions within each country and to related choices by governments with respect to liberalization.'

It is seen that Australia’s NBN which is to be rolled out by the incumbent TELSTRA, is subject to overview by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and will be a purely wholesale network. Obligations of structural separation have been imposed on TELSTRA through a structural separation undertaking (SSU) to prevent conflict of interest and ensure a level playing field in downstream markets. The Indian NOFN may need to consider similar precautions vide a suitable regulatory framework.

I found some though provoking comments for and against on NBN at
http://nbnconcerns.wordpress.com/. and
http://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/speeches/three-years-of-nbn-2-0-what-have-we-learnt/.      
A comparison with New Zealand and Singapore has been blogged here
 http://www.zdnet.com/nbn-how-aust-compares-to-singapore-and-nz-7000007426/.
A comparison with South Korea is blogged at http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/426682/nbn_vs_world_korean_experience/. What is distinctive about South Korea's success is the tackling of the entire broadband value chain and retention of competition as a means to spur growth. 

As the close of this entry I reproduce an extract from the Conclusion of the ITU Report on State of Broadband 2012.

 Broadband networks and services are more than simple infrastructure – they represent a set of transformative technologies that promise to change the way we communicate, work, play and do business.  It is essential that every country  takes  broadband  policy  into account to shape its future social and economic development and prosperity, emphasizing both the supply and demand sides of the market. Further, it is crucial to adequately evaluate the potential alternatives to be implemented in order to encourage private sector investment. A “one size fits all” policy to broadband roll-out could have negative implications for the ICT market. Finally, a detailed cost-benefit approach should be adopted when evaluating different public policies and regulatory options to promote the growth and development of broadband in different countries around the world.