Mexico Earthquake-Lessons for Indian Authorities and Indian Telecoms

On the afternoon of September 19, 2017 Mexico City was struck by an earthquake of 7.1 magnitude that injured thousands, rendered thousands homeless and killed more than 200 people in and around the city. This earthquake was preceded by one in Chiapas, Mexico, twelve days earlier, that killed 100 people. Ironically the city had in fact commemorated at 11 AM on September 19, 2017 the terrible 8.1 magnitude earthquake of 1985 that also occurred on September 19, and killed 5000 people apart from causing widespread damage to property.  

As luck would have it, I was flying towards Mexico City on 19.9.2017 when the earthquake struck. As the Benito Juárez Airport was temporarily shut down, our airplane was diverted to Houston, Texas till it got clearance to land in Mexico City. By that time, about 7 hours had past post the occurrence of the earthquake. My colleague and I had some difficulty finding a hotel as the one we had a booking in had been evacuated. My first night there was disturbed by evacuation drills which the authorities had ordered and there was no air-conditioning. I could hear sirens throughout the night. However, even so, I was amazed at the calm I saw around me. The electricity was up as were the telephone lines and internet. 

The next morning, we visited the venue of the conference we had traveled to attend and as expected under the circumstances, we found that it had been cancelled. The Government had declared a national emergency. A tour of the city revealed that while there were relatively few cars and pedestrians to be seen, the city was quietly gearing up for rescue / relief work. I saw many volunteers walking, moving in cars and aggregated in and around the Zocalo or Main Square, where water and other rations were being organised. Even as the television relayed videos of the desperate ongoing efforts to rescue people trapped under collapsed buildings, in general, for a capital that had just been struck by a major earthquake I found that people were calm and there was no sense of panic or chaos, at least in the areas I had visited.

Reportedly,  as per preliminary estimates the cost of the damages may be around USD 2 billion. Its going to be a long haul for Mexico as far as reconstruction and recovery go, but it is well prepared. The government has already started making electronic transfers to the victims. I had in fact studied Mexico’s Disaster Funding as a part of my work at the National Disaster Management Authority of India.   India has statutory funds created for disaster relief and immediate rehabilitation (The National and State Disaster Response Funds (NDRF & SDRFs)), and has a statutory provision for a National Disaster Mitigation Fund (that has not been created), but unlike Mexico, India lacks a dedicated funding mechanism for post disaster asset reconstruction. Thus, in India, reconstruction would invariably come at the expense of forgoing other committed expenditure, including that earmarked for developmental activities. Further, the Indian Government does not tap into risk transfer through insurance of public assets or through reinsurance mechanisms. India is vulnerable to both water and climate related disasters as well as geologically related disasters. As indicated in the below mentioned Discussion Paper, a Lloyds study (2004-11) finds that 85% of disaster related losses are uninsured in India. The overall low penetration on non-life insurance generally implies dependence on government funding /subsidies in the aftermath of disasters and eventually, this translates into a burden on tax payers.

In contrast, Mexico has a comprehensive ex ante mechanism for funding post disaster relief and reconstruction by way of the FONDEN, apart from a funding mechanism for mitigation through FORPDEN.

FONDEN’s operation relies on a clear framework for damage and loss assessments, resource allocation, funding channels and implementation timelines between federal and state government agencies after a disaster. This allows the Government of Mexico to manage emergency response and reconstruction funds with efficiency and transparency, while generating trust and discipline…..[b]y Law, FONDEN and its related funds (FOPREDEN and CADENA, a vehicle for agricultural insurance) must receive no less than 0.4 percent of the annual budget (around US$800 million in 2011), including any uncommitted funds in the Trust from the previous fiscal year. 

As funding requirements can vary, apart from risk retention by way of above mentioned budgetary allocations, FONDEN is also allowed to pay risk premiums towards insurance as a means of risk transfer. The Mexican Government has also issued multi-catastrophe bonds and has an indemnity-based insurance for FONDEN losses. All government infrastructure is compulsorily insured.(source GFDRR)

In India, the post disaster relief expenditure of states is often more than funding available through SDRF and NDRF. Further as stated above, the Government meets reconstruction expenditure from the general budget. In the event of a major disaster this would be supplemented by aid or external borrowing. As suggested in a Discussion Paper on Disaster Relief and Risk Transfer  that I had co-authored while at NDMA, we could allow the states to use a portion of the SDRF to buy insurance  towards relief and rehabilitation (over and above that available through the SDRF scheme) and towards reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. Further, the National Government could buy parametric insurance to safeguard against rarer, high impact disasters by using a dedicated portion of NDRF funds for insurance premium. (For further information, please read my article on the subject Reference: Gulati, Archana G., Financing Disaster Risk Reduction - The Indian Context (November 1, 2013). Presentation to the Expert Group Meeting on Effective Strategies for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 26-28 November 2013. )

This paper had also suggested other funding mechanisms such as compulsory disaster insurance for private homes, government property and revenue generating public utilities and extension of the scope of the existing public liability insurance to include public places such as hotels, cinema halls and other places where people congregate at events. Incentives by way of tax deduction for premiums could be provided. As the quantum of premiums would be linked to risk, compulsory insurance would also provide an incentive for disaster risk reduction or mitigation activities. This would also ensure that relief / reconstruction costs do not get passed on to the government in their entirety and that development related funds are not diverted for reconstruction activities.

Coming back to telecommunications, apart from the fact that in today's world, telecoms  are the lifeblood of economic and social activity, the government is also investing huge amounts in creation of public assets by way of Digital India and the National Optic Fibre Network. However, as per usual practice these assets are not insured. The Department of Telecommunication’s Crisis Management SOP 2017 and other disaster related documentation too are silent on funding for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Needless to say, disaster resilience of telecoms infrastructure is absolutely critical as disaster alerts, rescue efforts electronic funds transfers etc. all rely proximately on the unhindered continuation of telecoms connectivity. However, given the important role of telecoms and especially broadband in economic activity, we also need to evolve a comprehensive strategy for ex ante funding of damaged assets to avoid the adverse consequences of slow and expensive economic recovery, post disasters. This should invariably include a combination of risk retention (budgetary allotments) and risk transfer through insurance.

A presentation on the above can be viewed here.

Universal Service: Regulation, Competition and Contemporary Issues

Its been a long time since I wrote. An invitation to speak at a Conference on Universal Service in India in the context of India's broadband plan gave me the opportunity to put together some thoughts on Universal Service Regulation in India.  The use of Universal Service funding is in theory market friendly and complements liberalisation and competition. However, in practice, particularly in the context of roll out of national broadband networks, the design of USF interventions can do much harm to telecommunications sector by creating winners and losers, creating/exacerbating barriers to entry and distorting the competitive scenario. In the long run this would impede dynamic efficiency and harm the very objective of universal service.
Please see the slides here

Hitting the Nail on the Head

It was a delight to read an article titled, "Net neutral, shift gears" It reiterates strongly the reasons why hard won net neutrality must be preserved and safeguarded from anti-competitive attempts to introduce divisions within the internet. Yet, it urges India to bridge the digital divide and connect every Indian immediately.

The only point where I disagree is the present idea/version of NOFN. I believe that universal broadband coverage can be achieved much faster and in a much more cost efficient manner by sticking to the original USOF concept of bidding out districts/states/regions in a technology neutral , competitive process that enables interested telecom operators to provide connectivity as defined by the Fund, with a limited smart subsidy.

The creation of a huge administrative set up by way of a megalithic government organisation and funding it from USOF ; expecting it to deliver any better than a monopolistic government department  in pre-liberalisation India, is in my view a wasteful, pipe dream. Please see my previous blogs on NOFN/BBNL.

NOFN-Do we need PPP or plain USOF subsidy?

I reproduce below a news item regarding TRAI recommendations on NOFN 

I have previously pointed out that the simplest and fastest route to funding optic fibre roll out in rural areas would have been to faithfully follow the USOF model of bidding out service areas based on reveres auctions with open access conditions. This was done by USOF for the North Eastern states. That would have been akin to PPP based on BOO model rather than BOOT.

There is absolutely no reason for the ownership of the network to be with/transfer back to the government unless it is to justify the huge paraphernalia that has been created by way of BBNL.  The whole  idea of Universal Service Funds is to provide a minimal smart subsidy and let markets take over. 

Issues such as fair open access and Right of Way cannot necessarily be solved only by public equity participation. NOFN/BBNL  at present under public ownership has failed to deliver for past 4 years (including solving the RoW problem) and its cost has trebled. 

I have examined this debate earlier in my post "Broadband Networks through Infrastructure Sharing Route"  (also placed under the label NOFN). 

Its time we dusted the departmental files containing the original idea of universal service funding based on international best practices and allowed the Indian USOF to deliver as per its own original rules of competitive neutrality. 

The news article:

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) has recommended a public-private partnership (PPP) model for BharatNet, an ambitious project involving setting up a broadband network in rural India.

A model with private incentives and long-term service delivery similar to the build-own-operate transfer or build-operate-transfer models of implementation would be the preferred means of implementation, Trai said in its recommendations announced on Monday.

“PPPs seek to combine the private sector’s capacity for delivery with the Government’s role as an enabler and regulator to overcome market failures. PPPs must be viewed as not just an instrument for easing finance and capacity constraints, but as an effective tool towards ensuring competition in service delivery and improvement in quality of service,” Trai said.

A special purpose vehicle, the Bharat Broadband Network Limited (BBNL), under the telecom ministry is now handling rolling out the optical fibre network being executed by BSNL, Railtel and Power Grid.

The previous government had approved a project cost of Rs 20,000 crore for laying optical fibre network in 2011 but progress has been poor. It is expected that BharatNet will be completed by 2017-18, after missing many deadlines. Even the project cost has increased to about Rs 70,000 crore over the years. The project was earlier named the national optical fibre network but later renamed BharatNet by the current government.

Trai said the concessionaires should be given the job of deploying the optical fibre cable and other network infrastructure as well as operating the network during the period of contract. The contract period should be of 25 years which can be further extended in block of 10, 20 or 30 years.

The national optical fibre network (NOFN) project had failed in achieving its original objective of increasing broadband subscription in the country. The task of rolling out a broadband network should be given to a concessionaire selected through reverse bidding. Funding should be done to bridge the loss incurred due to higher operational expenses and lower commercial accruals, Trai said.

It can be safely concluded that the NOFN has failed in achieving its original objectives, the regulator said. Focusing on the design of the finance and investment model for future roll-out of broadband is critical.

The National Telecom Policy of 2012 (NTP 2012) envisaged broadband on demand by 2015, and 175 million broadband subscribers by 2017 with a minimum speed of 2 Mbps and up to 100 Mbps on demand. As of September 2015, the total number of broadband (defined as download speeds >=512 Kbps) subscribers stood at 120.88 million (largely concentrated in Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu), with only 27.20 million rural subscribers. This “internet divide” between rural and urban India has become more relevant as the scope of activities carried out on the Internet has expanded beyond what was previously imagined, Trai said.

Moreover, rural broadband access will help address multiple service deficits that arise due to other infrastructure related constraints widespread among the rural population. The potential gains from increasing such access are tremendous — the Report of the Committee on NOFN in its projections of the economic benefit from BharatNet estimated that an additional 25 million Internet users by 2018-19 would result in economic benefits of Rs 66,465 crore due to the direct, indirect and spillover benefits of Internet access.

It also recommended that the central and state governments become anchor clients of this project and purchase a bandwidth of 100 megabytes per second at market rate.

To ensure that the concessionaire does not discriminate between service providers in granting access of optical fibres, Trai has recommended arm's length relationship between concessionaire and service providers, adding that 50 per cent of the optical fibre should be reserved for telecom and cable service providers.

Besides, the government should become a minority partner of the concessionaire with 26 per cent stake as this would lower financing cost and risk. "In addition, this can help the government check monopolistic behaviour on the part of the concessionaire," Trai added.

Free Basics-Do we need Facebook to (selectively) connect India

I have read extensively and written previously on net neutrality. However, my pleasure in reading critics of breaching net neutrality principles has increased manifold since Facebook started placing full page ads in leading dailies. The quality of comments has improved. They are now more focussed and incisive. By Indian standards this is a desperate (and may I say vulgar display of desperation) attempt to patronisingly suggest that we need Facebook to connect India.

I am not denying that we have failed miserable in doing so, My entire blog is about how we have wasted opportunities to correct market failures and to correctly utilise universal service funds(USOF) in India. I have also pointed out regularly, the deficiencies in our approach to NOFN/BBNL.

The fact that we have multiple mobile operators in mobile/broadband does not tantamount to competition. Statistics suggest that our markets are far from competitive. This is reflected in high tariffs, low speeds and poor service quality. I place below evidence based on my own analysis of data.

Yet Facebook's blatant attempt to mislead the public and confuse the issue is something that I cannot stand by.  I reproduce below some excellent articles on the subject.

 The Hindu carries,firstly,
..Free Basics is not free, basic Internet as its name appears to imply. It has a version of Facebook, and only a few other websites and services that are willing to partner Facebook’s proprietary platform.

Today, there are nearly 1 billion websites. If we consider that there are 3.5 billion users of the Internet, 1 out of 3.5 such users also offers content or services. The reason that the Internet has become such a powerful force for change in such a short time is precisely because anybody, anywhere, can connect to anybody else, not only to receive, but also to provide content. All that is required is that both sides have access to the Internet.

All this would stop if the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or telecom companies (telcos) are given the right to act as gatekeepers. This is what net neutrality is all about — no ISP or telco can decide what part of the Internet or which websites we can access. Tim Wu, the father of net neutrality, has written that keeping the two sides of the Internet free of gatekeepers is what has given a huge incentive for generating innovation and creating content. This is what has made the Internet, as a platform, so different from other mass communications platforms such as radio and television. Essentially, it has unleashed the creativity of the masses; and it is this creativity we see in the hundreds of millions of active websites.

Facebook’s ads and Mark Zuckerberg’s advertorials talk about education, health and other services being provided by Free Basics, without telling us how on earth we are going to access doctors and medicines through the Internet; or education. It forgets that while English is spoken by only about 12 per cent of the world’s population, 53 per cent of the Internet’s content is English. If Indians need to access education or health services, they need to access it in their languages, and not in English. And no education can succeed without teachers. The Internet is not a substitute for schools and colleges but only a complement, that too if material exists in the languages that the students understand. Similarly, health demands clinics, hospitals and doctors, not a few websites on a private Facebook platform.

Regulate price of data
While the Free Basics platform has connected only 15 million people in different parts of the world, in India, we have had 60 million people join the Internet using mobiles in the last 12 months alone. And this is in spite of the high cost of mobile data charges. There are 300 million mobile broadband users in the country, an increase fuelled by the falling price of smartphones.

In spite of this increase in connectivity, we have another 600 million mobile subscribers who need to be connected to the Internet. Instead of providing Facebook and its few partner websites and calling it “basic” Internet, we need to provide full Internet at prices that people can afford. This is where the regulatory system of the country has to step in. The main barrier to Internet connectivity is the high cost of data services in the country. If we use purchasing power parity as a basis, India has expensive data services compared to most countries. That is the main barrier to Internet penetration. Till now, TRAI has not regulated data tariffs. It is time it addresses the high price of data in the country and not let such prices lead to a completely truncated Internet for the poor.

There are various ways of providing free Internet, or cost-effective Internet, to the low-end subscribers. They could be provided some free data with their data connection, or get some free time slots when the traffic on the network is low. 2G data prices can and should be brought down drastically, as the telcos have already made their investments and recovered costs from the subscribers.

The danger of privileging a private platform such as Free Basics over a public Internet is that it introduces a new kind of digital divide among the people. A large fraction of those who will join such platforms may come to believe that Facebook is indeed the Internet. As Morozov writes, the digital divide today is “about those who can afford not to be stuck in the data clutches of Silicon Valley — counting on public money or their own capital to pay for connectivity — and those who are too poor to resist the tempting offers of Google and Facebook” (“Silicon Valley exploits time and space to extend the frontiers of capitalism”, The Guardian, Nov. 29, 2015). As he points out, the basic delusion Silicon Valley is nurturing is that the power divide will be bridged through Internet connectivity, no matter who provides it or in what form. This is not likely to happen through their platforms.

The British Empire was based on the control of the seas. Today, whoever controls the data oceans controls the global economy. Silicon Valley’s data grab is the new form of colonialism we are witnessing now.

The Hindu also carries another article which is close to my heart as it focusses also on the issue of competition in telecoms.

If the objective is to connect the whole world to the Internet, then Free Basics by Facebook (previously known as internet.org) is a controversial method to achieve it. The company wants to provide a subset of the Internet free of charge to consumers, with mobile telecom operators bearing the costs of the traffic. Facebook acts as the unpaid gatekeeper of the platform.

This kind of arrangement has come to be called “zero rating” and attracted criticism from Internet civil society groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation. It argues that the Free Basics scheme has “one unavoidable, inherent flaw: Facebook’s central role, which puts it in a privileged position to monitor its users’ traffic, and allows it to act as gatekeeper (or, depending on the situation, censor)... there is no technical restriction that prevents the company from monitoring and recording the traffic of Free Basics users. Unfortunately, this means there is no guarantee that the good faith promise Facebook has made today to protect Free Basics users’ privacy will be permanent.”

Monopolists vs free market

In India, Internet civil society activists are opposing Facebook’s scheme for additional reasons. While the attempt to introduce new users to the Internet is a good thing, they argue, the scheme risks breaking the network into many smaller ones and skewing the playing field in favour of apps and services that enjoy privileged pricing.

Zero rating in general and Free Basics by Facebook in particular has many defenders among advocates of free markets and capitalism. They argue that if the mobile operator wishes to lose money or cross-subsidise some users at the cost of others, then it should be allowed to do so. Government intervention in pricing usually has bad unintended consequences, and it should be no different in the case of Internet traffic.

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has re-engaged in a public consultation seeking submissions on which path it should take: the conservative path of insisting on net neutrality, a laissez-faire approach of non-intervention in the decisions of private firms, or other options in between these two.

What seems to be taken for granted but should really surprise us is that companies and policymakers accept that getting the developing world online requires methods that are different from how the developed countries got there. So, how did the hundreds of millions of people around the world become Internet subscribers? Not because of government schemes, but because they could afford it. They could afford it because market forces — competition — drove prices down to levels that made an Internet connection affordable. Unless government policies get in the way, there is no reason why the same forces will not reduce prices further to make the service affordable to ever more people, with lower disposable incomes.

There is empirical evidence for this: the 980 million mobile phone subscribers in India are able to make phone calls because they can afford the charges. Even after some price capping by TRAI, most mobile telecom operators are doing well. Despite persistent call drops and atrocious customer service, consumers enjoy reasonably good service and the industry as a whole is fairly healthy.

All this happened without a mobile phone operator providing free calls to a limited set of numbers in order to demonstrate the value of mobile phones and to encourage more people to take up subscriptions. Operators did, however, innovate in retailing, launching prepaid packages and recharging these connections. On the flip side, they also cut costs by skimping on customer service, overloading spectrum and sharing tower infrastructure.

Competition is the key

TRAI should reflect on its own success in transforming India from a low teledensity country to a moderately high teledensity one. This happened not due to “no-frills services for poor and developing country users” but by ensuring that market competition is allowed to take its course. There is no reason why mobile Internet services will not become as popular as mobile phone services as long as there is adequate competition.

Therefore, the debate on whether or not to permit zero rating is beside the point. What TRAI ought to be asking is whether there is sufficient competition in its current policy framework. Should it be licensing more telecom operators? Has the government made enough spectrum available so that mobile operators can lower prices and ensure adequate service quality? Are there bottlenecks in the hands of monopolists that raise the costs of service?

The path to achieving the dream of Digital India lies not in foreign companies deciding on what basic services India’s poor ought to access free of charge, but by encouraging ever greater competition and a level playing field. This calls for the regulator to have a hawkish approach towards anti-competitive behaviour by existing market players.

Now, let’s say that the government really wishes to make the Internet affordable to citizens whose incomes are too low to pay for it. There is a good case for this based on positive externalities: that some benefits of an individual’s connection to the Internet accrue to society as a whole. Much like primary education, an Internet connection allows a citizen to participate in the modern economy. Just as society as a whole benefits if all citizens are educated, it benefits if all citizens are connected. To be clear, this is not an argument for the government to run telecom businesses. Rather, it is to say that it is in the public interest for nearly everyone to be connected to the Internet.

Growth as a force multiplier

While it is tempting to provide free or subsidised services — like we do in India for many such things — the best method to achieve this outcome is to raise people’s incomes. If the Indian economy grows at 8 per cent over several years, the income effect will make Internet connections more affordable even if prices do not fall.

In other words, the best scheme to bring the Internet to all involves boosting competition to bring down prices and pursuing economic growth to raise people’s incomes. This is the formula that has worked elsewhere in the world, has worked in India and will continue to work. Schemes like Free Basics by Facebook and Airtel Zero are unnecessary from the perspective of connecting the unconnected.

Now, Facebook is not a charity. So, it probably must have a good explanation to its shareholders why it is spending so much of its time and resources in promoting a good cause. That explanation is likely to go: “more Internet users in the world means more users for Facebook, which we monetise in our usual ways”. It might also hint that being the gatekeeper, however open, of Internet content for hundreds of millions of people will give it a lot more market power. This is important, for as Chamath Palihapitiya, venture capitalist and an early Facebook executive says, the company worries that it will lose out if it does not capture most of the world’s Internet content on its own platform.

TRAI must take a call on whether such business strategies are anti-competitive. But in dealing with the question, the regulator must not allow itself to be persuaded that such schemes are necessary for bringing the Internet to the masses.

NOFN/BBNL-Back to Square One Almost

I have not written for a while. Been busy in another sphere of regulation. However, I was drawn back to my much neglected blog by TRAI's recent Consultation paper on Implementation Model for BharatNet (BBNL has been rechristened BharatNet.)

So, after almost five precious years down the line and with nothing to show except inflated project estimates and an unnecessary bureaucracy created by way of BBNL, India's National Optic Fibre Network (NOFN) plan is being subject to public consultation. Its almost a case of reinventing the wheel which is right there in front of you by way of the existing regulatory structure of India's Universal service Obligation Fund (USOF). USOF Rules require the Government to provide incentive to telecom operators (public/private) to venture into commercially non viable rural telecommunications by way of subsidy to close the viability gap. The projects are to be designed with appropriate bidding units in mind (state/district etc.), subsidy benchmarking is to be carried out and projects are awarded through reverse bidding with the subsidy benchmark acting as the upper limit.

Had this been adhered to 5 years ago, we would have had the village to block level OFC laid out on open access basis by now. Different segments  (say state wise village to block level OFC, if states had been chosen as the bidding unit) would have been owned by different operators but connected at the district level to existing nation wide networks. This would have provided much needed OFC back haul at village level to telecom operators who often had to rely on unreliable microwave back haul, and provided a strong impetus to large/niche/small players in the rural broadband space.

Even now the TRAI paper talks about Build Own Operate and Transfer as the one option that would come closest to the USOF model. Why transfer. Why must the Government own telecoms infrastructure in a liberalised environment and be saddled with this depreciating asset? The whole philosophy of Universal Service has been lost in translation in the Indian scenario.   The creation and compulsion of  continued survival of BBNL is perhaps the reason why the Government cannot discard the concept of ownership. This goes against international best practices that point to smart, targeted use of universal service funds to incentivise operators and then leaving them to manage their business.The idea was never to create Government owned assets or to use the USOF to pay salaries to a bureaucratic organisation like BBNL. Unless our goals are clear , we will never get this right.

Please also see my previous posts on NOFN and BBNL.

NOFN-Getting it wrong yet again

An editorial humorously titled "Optical Illusion" correctly points out that the latest government effort to revive BBNL/NOFN by way of appointing a private sector chairman etc. is not likely to make much of a difference. However  the newspaper gets it wrong in suggesting that the USOF which is funding NOFN/BBNL, should be scrapped.

On the contrary, BBNL should be wound up and the methodology to achieve the laying of a high speed rural OFC network should go back to the traditional USOF method of achieving rural penetration through multiple (regional) reverse bidding based projects open to both public and private sector.

Just scrapping USOF (funded out of license fees paid by service providers) and leaving more money in the hands of service providers will not guarantee provision of broad band services to commercially unviable rural areas.

 I have written extensively on the subject under the same key words/labels. Please see my previous blogs.

Competitive Neutrality in Liberalized Sectors of the Economy

I have been blogging about the need for competitive neutrality mostly in the context of  broadband networks. However, the importance of regulatory neutrality would apply equally to any other liberalized sector be it say, power or airlines. I have written about this in a paper titled,

"Of Airwaves, Incumbents and Good Governance - The Urgent Need for a Robust Competition Policy Framework"

Interestingly, though seldom do papers in India comment on this problem in the context of telecommunications, I find mention of the issue in the context of power transmission. Thus the Financial Express has reported that,

The central power regulator’s bid to end public sector dominance in the transmission sector by putting in place a system to award new projects based on tariff-based competitive bidding (TBCB) is threatening to unravel with the power ministry deciding to virtually persist with the previous regime where the projects are given on a platter to the state-run Power Grid Corporation (PGCIL).

According to sources, the ministry has invoked a provision in the relevant Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) rules to give eight new transmission projects with an estimated cost of Rs 36,000 crore to PGCIL....The provision of “compressed time schedule” vests discretion with the ministry to nominate PGCIL for executing projects if it is convinced that the bidding route could delay projects that are of critical nature, requiring time-bound execution.

An industry official said: “Any incumbent that continues to have 70-80% market share will have a natural advantage over new entrants in terms of winning even future projects being bid out. Moreover, if that incumbent is a PSU, then it will have clear financing advantages which private players cannot match under current circumstances.”...

Criticising the government’s decision, an executive of a private firm involved in the transmission sector told FE on condition of anonymity that it was the need of the hour to encourage private participation in transmission so that it can bring global technologies to complete projects in compressed time schedules. 

This echoes what I have written about NOFN/BBNL. I particular in my paper titled,  "The State of Broadband in India: A Call for Regulatory Neutrality" wherein I have specifically mentioned that,

"Public funding in a developing nation has to  be undertaken with particular care on account of the opportunity cost of allocating scarce resources. Subsidy schemes are designed to minimise costs and avoid duplicating expensive infrastructure. This could explain BSNL’s nomination in the Wireline Broadband scheme, its winning the bid in the Assam OFC scheme and its role in the forthcoming NOFN.  While this approach makes apparent sense in terms of short term financial prudence, its impact on the long term growth of the sector is unlikely to be positive given that it stifles competition and all its concomitant benefits. From a bureaucratic perspective, relying on public ownership or funding the incumbent is also perhaps more attractive in the short run in terms of relatively less time and effort estimated to commence roll outs (as against tendering/auction), even if we were to assume that public sector could and would deliver. However, the long term impact of monopoly ownership of even open access networks (on competition and accompanying aspects such as innovation/customer service/technological neutrality) merit consideration. If nothing else, our experience with monopoly in wire lines should have cautioned us. USOF had almost got it right with its regional OFC schemes, but it needs to be rescued from over specification of technology and incumbent -centric scheme design through regulation which insists inter alia on competitive neutrality. Thus, rather than doing away with USOF as is the demand of the aggrieved private sector, a relook at its regulatory structure and a focus on competitive neutrality would be the order of the day..." 

Broadband Planning in India-Missing the Wood for the trees

I reproduce below the text of my article with the same title. It was published in the Financial Express today.

In the recent TRAI consultation paper titled Delivering Broadband Quickly: What do we Need to do?, the issues delineated for stakeholder consultation give the impression that the solution lies in controlling or influencing technological choices or costs. In a liberalised sector, healthy competition accompanied by efficient regulation would mean that market dynamics guide appropriate technological and cost choices, without government intervention. When regulatory interventions go beyond what is necessary to correct market failure, they create and exacerbate market distortions, doing more harm than good. India’s abnormally low ratio of wirelines to wireless connections is part of the broadband problem. While the paper has fleetingly mentioned public sector monopoly in this segment, it has not related the same to poor and falling wireline penetration in our country. Nor has it mentioned the abysmal state of rural broadband penetration, which persists in being negligible in spite of billions of rupees of funding to the incumbent in support of its wireline services by way of access deficit charges and universal service funding.

The relationship between competitive service provision and innovation, quality, and long-term growth in telecommunications is too well known to ignore, and unless efforts are made to correct underlying regulatory problems and consequential market distortions, we may not be able to move forward.

Sadly, one of the most market-friendly initiatives of the government which is key to promotion of broadband—the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF)—has also fallen prey to the same lack of understanding. The USOF subsidy is given to willing market players (universal service providers or USPs) to cover the viability gap and hence encourage them to provide services in commercially unviable areas. The USOF subsidised facilities are owned by USPs rather than by the government. Thus, USOF is potentially a valuable tool for minimalistic, targeted interventions to achieve greater penetration of broadband in a competition friendly manner.

A very important aspect of preventing market distortion is ensuring technological neutrality and competitive neutrality. The former would imply defining deliverables to be achieved through the USOF subsidy, while leaving specific technology choices and configurations to USPs’ wisdom. The latter implies that no entity operating in an economic market should be subject to undue competitive advantages or disadvantages.

It is well known that while the government as regulator is supposed to ensure a level-playing field, the government as owner of public enterprises may face difficulties in balancing various conflicting commercial and non-commercial interests.However, regulatory neutrality, which encompasses both technological and competitive neutrality, is a sine qua non for economic efficiency or welfare maximisation.

From data available on the USOF website, it would appear that USOF’s present regulatory framework has been unsuccessful in this regard. USOF had disbursed R17,580 crore of subsidy up to January 31, 2014, of which rural fixed line telephony and broadband based schemes taken together account for about 95%. Yet rural teledensity at 43% is made up almost entirely of private sector wireless connections. Rural wireline teledensity is less than 1% and broadband penetration negligible. BSNL’s monopoly in the rural wireline and optic fibre segment has meant that majority of the USOF support (focused disproportionately on fixed lines) has been given to BSNL on nomination basis. The other technologies mentioned in the Trai paper would perhaps have been deployed by USPs long ago, had USOF’s schemes been technologically neutral.

The USOF website reveals that the roll out of deliverables by BSNL as USP has been delayed consistently. For example, against a target of approximately 8.8 lakh broadband connections and 28,000 broadband kiosks by January 2014 under the Wireline Broadband Scheme, BSNL had provided only about 4.3 lakh broadband connections and less than 11,000 kiosks. Despite its poor track record, BSNL was chosen as one of the three PSUs to partner in the National Optical Fibre Network (NOFN) project through the creation of Bharat Broadband Network Limited (BBNL).

NOFN’s tardy progress has been documented in the consultation paper. While dwelling on which model to adopt for rural OFC backhaul, the USOF model of reverse bidding with the lowest bidder (public or private) setting up open access networks under contract was considered, but rejected as being tedious and long drawn, as it involves subsidy benchmarking. Instead, the BBNL route was chosen. The result of this choice made three years ago is out there for us to see. BBNL has not made even a dent in the targeted roll out (2.5 lakh gram panchayats by 2014) and what’s worse is the reported doubling of estimated costs from Rs 20,000 crore (A crore is 10 million) to more than Rs 40,000 crore. 

Going forward, a focus on regulatory neutrality would be the order of the day and a major part of what needs to be done.

Lessons from Down Under

An article titled "Australia's Last Chance for Infrastructure Competition" describes failed opportunities as far as introducing competition in the wire line broadband market. This is said to be in stark contrast to the mobile telecoms segment where competition and innovation have flourished. The article states that the government is now looking to promote platform competition in high speed broadband.(HSBB)

I am always sufficiently wary of superimposing models from the developed world on to the Indian telecoms scenario because apart from many other aspects, regulatory structures and capacities and penetration levels are different, but I do believe that we can learn something from their experience.

I have written earlier under the same labels as this post in favour of a technology neutral and multi-operator, approach to high speed broadband penetration in India. Getting NOFN / BBNL off the ground in my view would be a Herculean effort whose success in the near future if at all is doubtful. The earlier USOF approach of tendering out region-wise HSBB network projects would work much better as it would allow many operators other than the incumbent to participate. Investment and innovation would take off and the roll out would be much quicker bringing much needed broadband to our young aspiring population,especially in rural India.

Previous USOF OFC schemes suffered from flaws such as overspecialization of technology but had several progressive features such as mandatory open access and even allowing the selected Universal Service Provider to complete the project by renting  bandwidth from existing players to  (rather than necessarily laying fresh OFC). USOF India needs to think beyond PSU led nation wide OFC networks if we are to progress. A technology mix in wire line broadband would be welcome. Please see my previous posts in this regard.

If wishes were horses...

It is reported that,

" [t]he cabinet on Wednesday approved the ambitious Digital India programme that aims to connect all gram panchayats by broadband internet, promote e-governance and transform India into a connected knowledge economy......The vision of the programme is centred on three key areas: digital infrastructure as a utility to every citizen - digital identity, mobile phone and bank account, safe & secure cyber space; governance & services on demand - services available in real time on online and mobile platform, making financial transactions electronic and cashless, & digital empowerment of citizens - all documents, certificates available on cloud.Digital India envisages connecting 2.5 lakh villages by broadband and phones, reduce import of telecom imports to zero, wi-fi in 2.5 lakh schools, all universities, public wi-fi hotspots for citizens and creating 1.7 crore direct and 8.5 crore indirect jobs. Other impact points include training 1.7 crore citizens for IT, telecom and electronics jobs, and delivering e-governance and e-services."

As usual the programme that comes at a hefty cost of more than Rs one billion hinges on the success of USOF India's National Optic Fibre roll-out for broadband delivery.

All one can say is good luck with that! The same news item explains why I hold this view:

"Soon after assuming office, IT and telecom minister Ravi Shankar Prasad had said that the new BJP-led government will on priority take up the plan to connect 2,50,000 gram panchayats through the optic fibre network. The government plans to connect 50,000 gram panchayats this fiscal year itself ending March 31, 2014, one lakh in the next fiscal year and a similar number the year after.      The Rs 21,000-crore NOFN project - fully funded by the USOF - was unveiled by the UPA to digitally connect 2,50,000 gram panchayats. However, the project has not progressed much so far - delayed by over three years - due mainly as the cable laying and ducting process is yet to be finished. Among the pillars is mobile connectivity for all, which includes covering all the about 42,300 unpenetrated villages at a cost of Rs 16,000 crore to be completed by 2017-2018."

Views on the manner of planning and execution of NOFN / BBNL and alternative means of achieving broadband  roll outs through USOF are documented in previous posts. 

Interestingly, years after the project was initiated by way of an SPV of three public sector companies, the telecom regulator while commenting on the Digital India Plan has reportedly stated that the NOFN project is running over three years behind target and only 8% of the 0.18 million  kms of optic fibre has been rolled out. He says that private sector should be involved in NOFN roll out and that,

"Investment of private players could significantly reduce the cost of the entire   the project and therefore final tariffs"

The regulator also rightly points out the need for detailed planing of the actual content for the envisaged e-government services rather than limiting the plan to vague terminology such as e-health,e-education and the need to involve private sector in content development (rather than just depending on strengthening/ revamping the state agencies  as a means to achieve the plan.)

Disruptive Technology and Public Funding of High Speed Broadband Networks

In my posts on the issue of National Broadband Plan and Broadband  Networks, I have consistently cautioned against creating publicly funded monopolies for OFC Networks and reminded readers about the regulatory issues involved in managing our legacy of wire line based incumbents. One of the reasons for avoiding the same is the nature of telecommunications where technology change is the rule.The advent of affordable  and competitively provided mobile services debunked the notion of telecoms as natural monopolies, yet we risk repeating this faulty argument when it comes to high speed broadband.

In India, the Public Sector Incumbents BSNL and MTNL have been supported with billions of rupees to survive in a competitive environment. However, not even their dominance in wire line telephony has helped them compete with a nimble private sector. On the other hand, regulatory protection of legacy public investment in their wire line networks has had a negative effect on competition in that segment in the country. The result is very poor broadband penetration.

Today's Times of India carries an article about a new laser developed by the California Institute of Technology that promises to greatly  outdo the speed of existing OFC cables (that are based on older S-DBF lasers). This sort of disruption should be expected in telecommunications. There could be many more such developments even before the roll out of nation-wide  OFC network projects which is underway in many counties (like India's NOFN by BBNL) is even completed. What then will be the fate of the sunk (public) investment in these (then) obsolete megalithic OFC networks?

This will inevitably throw up complex regulatory issues such as those described above, with less than optimal results. This brings me back to what I wrote in my posts titled  "Broadband Networks through Infrastructure Sharing" and National Broadband Networks: Regulation, Universal Service, Competition and Monopolies."

We may need to learn from the story about the "Tortoise and the Hare" that we may not win in the long run if in our haste to speed up high speed broadband deployment, we ride roughshod over hard learned lessons about competition and technological neutrality.

Delay in NOFN Roll Out-As Expected

The Economic Times today reports yet another delay in roll out of NOFN by BBNL as the PSUs are unable to award contracts worth Rs 6 billion for cable laying and trenching. 

I would invite readers to review my post titled, "National Broadband Plans-The Largely Unexamined Competition Debate" under the label NOFN. I have already covered in previous posts, my reasoning as to why  India should have hesitated before venturing to roll out a country wide network using the nomination route involving Public Sector Incumbents. When various option were being examined as to which methodology to choose for NOFN, there was an explicit impatience with the usual USOF method of first arriving at subsidy benchmarks and then bidding out a scheme on a regional/sub-regional basis to all eligible operators. This was frowned upon as too tedious and a source of delay. 

It was decided that creating an SPV of PSUs would be the better way forward especially as BSNL already owns the chunk of rural OFC networks.

I have examined this debate in my post "Broadband Networks through Infrastructure Sharing Route"  (also placed under the label NOFN). An alternative model has been presented to readers. One that is based on bidding.

 The right way in  my view would have been to encourage/mandate  BSNL to share its OFC capacity with the region wise winning bidder and to include the leasing plus incentive cost in the subsidy benchmarks. With this arrangement the network could have been rolled out by multiple USPs thereby creating the required  non-discriminatory open access  OFC backbone in rural blocks  with no adverse impact on competition. The facilitation extended by USOF (Central Government) by way of coordination with state governments for right of way clearances could have been done in this model too. This would probably have gone faster and ensured that at least  a good proportion  if not all villages would be reaping the benefits of high capacity OFC backbones connectivity by now.

Progress the E-way

A though provoking article "Solving Social issues through Technology" draws attention to the progress India has made in the realm of technology (reference the latest Mars mission) and the need to harness technology to bring education, facilities and opportunities to rural Indians and others who aspire to break out of poverty. It pins hope inter alia upon the NOFN.

Another article, "Technology rings in Financial Inclusion" highlights that in India, 65% of population has no access to banking but mobile phones  can change that. Innovative applications can enhance financial literacy and in fact, it has been proven by field research that even illiterate Indians take to financial inclusion apps and become adept at mobile banking.

All this has been said before (and posted about before in this blog). What we need most in my opinion is the Market Efficiency side of reforms to ensure that connectivity is widespread and universally available and that regulations encourage the use of ICTs including all aspects of the mobile/broadband ecosystem. This includes of course Universal Service Regulation.

Is this what NOFN was Meant to Do?

Another article appeared today in the Economic Times about NOFN/BBNL  plans to acquire an ISP license to provide e-services based on Wi-Fi in rural areas.

I had written earlier about the proposal to provide Wi-Fi for India's rural local Government offices and my worries on this count. 

Firstly focusing energies on the Village Panchayat Telephone or Government sponsored Common Service Centres(for internet) has not met with notable success in the past. What has succeeded  is the creation of a conducive environment for services and applications to flourish on a commercial basis.

 Thus, in the pre-mobile revolution era, India's subsidised Village Public Telephones which were supposed to be the village life line were often found to be lying in disrepair or being used as private phones of rural elite but once wireless appeared on the scene, commercially run public phones did roaring business.

Secondly, I fail to understand why the Government must select the technology and service provider to deliver e-Government services to citizens. If this was bid out with desired specifications, the lease cost solution could be selected. This would be conistent with the regulations laid down for Universal Service Funding in India

Thirdly, public money (USOF) is being used to fund NOFN/BBNL's OFC roll out which was meant for areas that markets would not serve. Thus, the network was to provide high capacity backhaul from villages to blocks on a non discriminatory basis. NOFN was never meant to be a service provider. If the argument is that its viability is uncertain, well, that is exactly why it is being fully subsidised. If  USOF was to float another tender for broadband access in non viable areas, then the selected access providers would need  back haul and BBNL would get its business and revenues. Ignoring competitive neutrality today means a heavy cost in terms of poor telecommunications in the future. We have already seen this pan out in the case of fixed lines and rural broadband in India.Should we be repeating the same mistakes?

Please also see my posts on NBN and lessons for NOFN.

Limiting Public Funding to Access Gaps

It is reported that the fact Sing Tel Optus has plans to roll out fibre to the  "basements of apartment buildings and shopping complexes [ and use] [t]he existing copper wiring within the buildings .. to deliver faster, NBN-like broadband speeds is being seen as a threat to NBN's viability. There are apparently other operators with similar plans too.

My question is why should the Government sponsor/fund NBN like roll outs in cities where markets may (and will) serve customers? Why should NBN's business model have factored in markets where competition cannot be ruled out?

It has been stated that,

Breaking NBN Co’s business model could force it to be reclassified from a profitable investment to a multibillion-dollar expense on the federal budget... NBN Co’s entire business model ran on the assumption of a flat national price for all customers. Labor’s NBN was designed to act as a cross-subsidy system where the higher revenues generated by city users paid for broadband in the bush.

This business model was discarded with the onset of  competition in  erstwhile monopolistic and fixed line based telecoms markets across the world. I have written earlier about the flawed and "Back to the Future" feel of ambitious National Broadband Plans based on incumbent centric National Broadband Networks.

Again there are lessons for India's NOFN which is basing its arguments of veering way from its original mandate of strictly (actual access) gap filling based on similar fallacious business viability models.

The NBN Debate Continues-Lessons for India's NOFN?

It is reported that an independent review of NBN ordered by the new Coalition Government of Australia has found that NBN costs and time lines have been understated and revenues overstated.

The news report states that,

"'The  full cost of Labor's original National Broadband Network plans would blow out by $29 billion and be completed three years late, the strategic review has found.

Communications Minister Malcolm Turnbull released details of the review he started 60 days ago on Thursday.The review found the fibre-to-the-premises NBN under Labor would have cost $73 billion, $29 billion more than forecast, and not be completed until 2024.It also found the current NBN Co corporate plan had overestimated revenues from the network by $13 billion.While the review found the cost and timing of the original plans would blow out, Opposition communications spokesman Jason Clare challenged the review's findings.He released an internal government analysis of the Coalition's plans, which he said revealed the new government's plans were "the wrong approach", and would not achieve the promised speeds.

Mr Turnbull has pledged download speeds of 50mbps by 2019 under the Coalition's plan, which will rely on copper connecting to fibre nodes, rather than brining the higher-speed fibre direct to all homes.

But Mr Clare said the analysis should the two stage approach - with 25mbps promised by 2016, expanding to 50mbps by 2019 - was unworkable.

He said the government's fibre-to-the-node plan would lower revenues from the network by 30% and the actual cost of fixing the existing Telstra-owned copper network, and was "unknown".

But Mr Turnbull said the review found the Labor network was "never achievable", and the results of the review would be "a crucial input into government policy".

Clearly the debate can go on forever. Nevertheless a mid term policy/projectreview and corrective steps are a good idea for any ambitious national broadband network roll out. India's NOFN/BBNL is already in difficulties. Ironically though it is being heavily subsidized because it is supposed to be financially nonviable and the PSU SPV route was chosen to cut red tape in Right of Way and other such causes of delay; the three PSU implementation partners in charge of this project are now citing the very same reasons for their difficulties and delays. Time for a review of costs and revenue projections and last but not lease scheme design? 

Internet for Indian Villages-Where does the solution lie?

One possible answer is that we have to encourage community participation rather than purely top down supply side big schemes. We have had little success with the former as for example the Common Service Centre scheme of Department of IT. 

My previous post "Wi Fi Internet for Indian Village Local Government Offices-Going Around in Circles?" has already suggested that USOF's proposed project for wi-fi and internet at panchayat offices may not necessarily meet with success as far as bringing internet to ordinary rural folk goes. I believe we have to allow big schemes to include the end users and NGOs into the design is we are to succeed. 

A good example of such a project has been documented in an article titled "Let NGOs provide rural net services" It describes a success story wherein involving and training locals in villages to provide services where big operators are not interested with the help of NGOs has enabled even illiterate villagers to benefit from online content (such as audio-visual content).

Such schemes require far more effort and time as was the case of USOF's Sanchar Shakti. However they are worth it in terms of outcomes.

 Einstein had famously said insanity is repeating the same thing again and again and expecting different results. Time to change our approach? 

Wi Fi Internet for Indian Village Local Government Offices-Going Around in Circles?

A news item in the Times of India (November 30, 2013)  titled "Govt clears internet wi-fi plan for rural India" states that a proposal to provde wi-fi hotspots and internet connections to India's Gram Panchayats has recently been approved. Slated to cost Rs 37.5 billion and targeted to be completed by 2016, the project will be funded by Indian USOF and will ride on NOFN infrastructure, 

This may be an excellent idea with two caveats. 

One is that past experience has shown that telecom services in Panchayats tend to be used only by the rural elite and are unavailable to the common people. During USOF inspections I have seen private public calling offices doing roaring business whereas the USO funded village public telephone located in the village panchayat (local self government office) bang opposite, on the other side of the village mud track was being exclusively used by the local elite. Villagers were in fact unaware of this state funded facility. Thus, given the social and economic set up of Indian villages such facilities could encourage better data keeping and connectivity within the government set up but are likely to percolate to rural society at large. The village school may have been a better venue for such a facility if empowering the common people is the aim, but then more effort would be involved in managing, maintaining and manning the facility. I have written before about the need to look at various other facets of the demand side eco-system. You need applications and trainers/facilitators in rural India. This requires a multi-stakeholder approach to project design. A good and successful example is USOF's Sanchar Shakti.

My second concern is who is providing the last mile service. I hope it is not NOFN. The entry of NOFN into access segment would in my view negate the very idea of Universal Service as a modern mechanism in a liberalized sector as being different from state owned monopoly service provision. Please see my previous articles in this regard under the same labels.

USOF India-Problem of Plenty

My last post suggested that perhaps USOF India needs to consider a review of regulation to ensure a level playing field. It should not become a another channel for funding the incumbent operator. The idea of the Universal Service Levy was in the nature of pay or play i.e. it would go back to those operators who participated in rural roll out. However the exception of funding the PSU incumbent by nomination rather than designing schemes for tendering is becoming the norm and private operators continue to expand their rural market share at the cost of the incumbent at their own cost!

A news item titled "USO Fund: Higher levy, lower allocation" bemoans the rising collection of USL and quotes an operator association (GSMA) as follows:

“[The USOF} needs to align the funding demands made on operators with its funding needs and with the financial state of the operators, seeking alternative funding sources where appropriate. It also needs to develop clear, transparent policies that are aligned with defined short- and mid-term milestones. USO policies should also focus on needs not met by markets,” 

Of course the NOFN project shall take up the lion's share of accumulation of USL and this project given on nomination basis to a SPV of three PSUs is already showing the typical signs of time and cost overruns.